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Introduction 
The case for public expenditure on education is based on its contribution to the good of 
society over and above the benefits received by the individual educated. These benefits can be 
economic, the benefits of a larger pool of educated labour that allow for rapid economic 
development, and social, including the benefits of more committed law abiding citizens and 
the relief of poverty.  
Governments around the world have committed themselves to achieving the goals of 
Education for All (EFA). However, for many countries this is a major challenge. EFA will 
require substantial improvements in school enrolment rates, school completion rates, gender 
parity, and learning outcomes for all students. These improvements will be difficult to achieve 
when key educational resources—teachers, support staff, buildings, equipment, textbooks—
are already scarce and under intense pressure from population growth and increased school 
participation rates. How can countries better organise and plan their educational systems to 
give EFA a chance of being achieved? 
Economic analysis can help education and policy makers who are facing difficult decisions by 
analysing the benefits and costs of using scarce educational resources under competing 
alternatives. 
Key questions are how much should governments spend on education, who and what should 
their spending be directed to, and how can they ensure that their spending is effective. Data 
from the World Education Indicators (WEI) and the various OECD indicators show that there 
is considerable variation on these matters1. Some of the issues are considered in this paper:  
1. The level of public expenditure on education and its distribution in relation to need 
2. Where expenditure can yield most benefits 
3. The incentives and system level organisation and guidelines to ensure that 
expenditures are used effectively  
Level and distribution of expenditures in relation to need 
Table 1 provides selected data on educational expenditure and finance for countries 
participating in the World Education Indicators (WEI) and OECD collections. There are 
variations across countries that can only in part be explained by the differences in their level 
of income per head. They reflect the political and social history of the countries and may not 
be easily changed. However it is reasonable to note the differences and to ask why they 
should persist into the future. 
Countries in the OECD tend to spend a greater proportion of their much higher GDP per head 
on education than do the lower income countries which participate in the WEI exercise. The 
income levels of rich countries make it possible to spend not only more and proportionately 
more.  
Private finance is a higher proportion of spending in the WEI countries than the OECD 
countries. This may reflect shortages in the provision of publicly-funded education places in 
WEI countries, as well as high private rates of return to education investments. Private 
                                                 
1  WEI countries  are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay and  Zimbabwe but only 
a subset supply data on the majority of items. The 30 members of the OECD are mainly high income countries.  
. 
finance for education is a very low proportion of spending in most European countries and the 
only a few OECD countries such as Korea, Japan, USA and Australia have a considerable 
level of private finance. 
Countries also vary considerably in the extent to which public funds are provided to non-
government providers of education. It is notable that India has a much higher allocation of 
public funds to the private sector than the average for WEI countries and that Australia has a 
high allocation relative to other OECD countries. 
Table 1. Expenditure and finance, 2003 or 2004 
i. Expenditure by level of education and source of funds as percent of GDP 
  Primary, secondary and  post-secondary non-tertiary education 
Country Public Private Total 
India  2.6 0.9 3.5 
WEI mean  3.0 0.5 3.1 * 
Australia 3.4 0.7 4.1 
OECD mean  3.6 0.3 3.9 
 Tertiary education 
Country Public Private Total 
India  0.7 0.2 0.8 
WEI mean  0.8 ... ... 
Australia 0.8 0.8 1.5 
OECD mean  1.1 0.4 1.4 
 All levels of education 
Country Public Private Total 
India  3.3 1.2 4.5 
WEI mean  4.0 m m 
Australia 4.3 1.5 5.8 
OECD mean  5.2 0.7 5.9 
ii. Distribution of total public expenditure on education by destination of funds (%) 
Primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
(%) Tertiary education (%) 
Country 
Direct public 
expenditure on 
public 
institutions 
Direct public 
expenditure 
on private 
institutions 
Indirect public 
transfers and 
payments to the 
private sector 
Direct 
public 
expenditure 
on public 
institutions 
Direct public 
expenditure on 
private 
institutions 
Indirect public 
transfers and 
payments to 
the private 
sector 
India 72    28    0    79    21    0    
WEI mean 91    8    2    85    5    10    
Australia 77    20    3    65    n    35    
OECD mean 87    11    3    72    11    17    
Source: UNESCO 2006 
Note: * Means are unweighted averages for the countries reporting; in some cases this causes the total to differ 
substantially from the sum of its elements 
m data not reported as appears inconsistent with other sections of the table 
 
The first section of Table 2 shows the variation in spending across levels of education. In the 
richer countries of the OECD spending per student rises a little with the level of schooling, 
with a more major increase for tertiary education where the spending is more than twice that 
for primary education. Across the WEI countries the spending rises across levels of schooling 
but sharply for tertiary where spending is about four times the level of primary. The pattern 
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for India is different. There is a marked jump in spending for upper secondary schooling and 
then a further jump for tertiary with spending at tertiary level six times that of primary. 
Since only a relatively small proportion of people participate in tertiary education in most 
WEI countries, this distribution of spending implies a high level of subsidy to groups who are 
probably already well advantaged. 
The sharp rises in spending per student are partly reflected for India in the ratios of pupils to 
teaching staff shown in the second section of Table 2. There is a marked fall in the ratios for 
senior secondary and then for tertiary. This however is less evident for other WEI countries 
and for the OECD countries the ratio of students to teachers is higher at tertiary level than at 
secondary level. The extra expenses at that level are not directed at teacher numbers but to 
other resources. The Indian data on teacher salaries in Table 2 also indicate that upper 
secondary teachers have considerably higher salaries on average than primary teachers. To the 
extent that teacher salaries reflect teacher quality this, along with lower pupil-teacher ratios, 
implies that teaching resources are particularly heavily concentrated in upper secondary 
education. 
The third section of Table 2 shows that for the WEI and the OECD that class sizes are larger 
than student teacher ratios, implying that not all teacher time is deployed in the class room in 
face to face teaching. In India the class sizes are similar to the teacher ratios at primary level. 
This suggests that primary teachers are provided with relatively little time for preparation, 
planning and professional development. 
The final section of Table 2 is perhaps the most interesting. It shows teachers salaries in US 
dollars adjusted for local purchasing power (PPP) and also the salaries expressed as a 
percentage of GDP per capita. The existence of a large rural population with very low per 
capita incomes affects the way such data can be interpreted. A useful statistic for all countries 
would be the ratio of teacher salaries to the average for other professional or skilled workers, 
but data for this is not easily compiled. 
In the OECD countries the salaries of teachers tend to be somewhat above per capita income, 
but not as much as in low-income countries. They do not vary much over the levels of 
schooling. In some countries like Australia there is relatively little increase in salaries with 
experience or high-level performance, seen as affecting the capacity of schools to retain 
teachers. In lower income countries, with a wide distribution of income, teacher salaries are 
high relative to per capita income.  
India is notable for having a very high level of teachers’ salaries compared to per capita 
income. This means that for a given share of the GDP devoted to education India can employ 
many fewer teachers than can countries where teacher salaries are low relative to GDP per 
capita. This could be taken to indicate that India invests in relatively well paid teachers rather 
than in more teachers, but that needs separate analysis. 
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Table 2. Use of resources, 2003 or 2004 
i. Annual expenditure on educational institutions per student relative to GDP per capita, %  
Secondary education 
 
Pre-primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
Upper 
secondary 
education 
All 
secondary 
education 
All tertiary 
education 
Primary 
to tertiary 
education 
India 3   13   13   41   25   77   20   
WEI mean 9   13   15   18   16   58   18   
Australia ...   18   24   27   25   40   24   
OECD mean 18   20   23   28   26   43   26   
ii. Pupils to teaching staff by level of education  
 
Pre-primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
Upper 
secondary 
education 
All 
secondary 
education 
All 
tertiary 
education 
Tertiary (A) & 
advanced research 
programmes 
India 40.5 39.9 37.1 27.5 32.4 22.2 22.2 
WEI mean 23.3 24.3 23.9 20.7 20.1 17.8 ... 
Australia ... 16.4   12.3 ... 15.5 
OECD mean 14.8 16.9 13.7 12.7 13.3 15.5 16.3 
iii. Average class size in public institutions by level of education 
 Primary public institutions Lower secondary public institutions 
India 40 39 
WEI Mean 28 35 
Australia 24 24 
OECD mean 21 24 
iv. Teachers' salaries in US dollars (PPP)  
 
Teachers' salaries in US dollars (PPP) Teachers' salaries in US dollars (PPP) as a 
percentage of GDP per capita 
Country Starting salary 
Salary after 15 years 
of experience 
Salary at top of 
scale 
Starting 
salary 
Salary after 15 
years of experience 
Salary at top 
of scale 
  Primary education   Primary education  
India 11,547 18,927 … 402 658 … 
WEI mean 7,622 9,645 13,128 145 183 206 
Australia 29,712 43,991 43,991 92 136 136 
OECD average 25,727 35,099 42,347 95 130 157 
 Lower secondary education Lower secondary education 
India 14,024 20,999 22,826 488 730 794 
WEI mean 8,886 10,990 15,623 167 206 275 
Australia 30,062 44,139 44,139 93 136 136 
OECD average 27,560 37,488 45,277 97 132 159 
 Upper secondary education (general programmes) 
Upper secondary education (general 
programmes) 
India 17,036 22,610 26,943 592 786 937 
WEI mean 9,992 12,110 16,307 192 228 292 
Australia 30,062 44,139 44,139 93 136 136 
 28,892 40,295 48,197 102 142 170 
Note: Teachers with minimum level of training, PPP is purchasing power parity 
 
This relatively (not absolutely) high cost of teachers partly explains why the actual access to 
education in India is relatively low, given that the proportion of GDP spent on education is 
not markedly low. Table 3 shows that only 70 per cent of 5 to 14 year olds are in school in 
India compared with an average of 90 per cent for the WEI countries and virtually 100 per 
cent for the OECD countries. Over 90 per cent of the population is enrolled for 4 years in 
India compared with an average of 8 years for WEI countries and higher (11 years) for the 
OECD countries. 
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The third section of Table 3 shows that female participation in education is similar to males at 
most levels and higher in tertiary education in most countries. Part of the apparent 
disadvantage of males in tertiary education in OECD countries may be explained by their 
higher rate of entry into jobs that involve workplace training (e.g. through apprenticeships). In 
contrast to the prevailing pattern the rate of female participation in education is lower in India 
in upper secondary education and in tertiary education.  
 
Table 3.Who receives education 2003 or 2004 
i. Students in public and private institutions as a percentage of the population in that age group 
  Enrolment rates 
Country Ages 3-4 Ages 5-14 Ages 15-19 Ages 20-29 Ages 30-39 Age 40+ 
India 2 70 37 7 n N 
WEI mean 20 90 54 ... ... ... 
Australia 42 99 82 33 14 6 
OECD mean 66 98 81 25 6 2 
Full-time and part-time students 
ii. Number of years and age range at which over 90% are enrolled in primary and secondary  
education 
Country Ending age of compulsory education (in years) 
Number of years at which over 
90% of the population is 
enrolled 
Age range at which over 90% of the 
population is enrolled (in years) 
India 14    4 6-11 
WEI mean 14    8    
Australia 15    12 5-16 
OECD mean 16    11       
iii. Female enrolment as a percentage of total enrolment, by level of education 
Country Pre-primary education 
Primary 
education 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
Upper 
secondary 
education 
All secondary 
education 
All tertiary 
education 
India 49 47 44 41 43 40 
WEI Mean 49 48 49 50 49 52 
Australia 49 49 49 47 48 54 
OECD Mean 49 49 49 50 49 53 
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Using expenditure to good effect 
Detailed economic analysis led by Hanushek (2006) has shown that it is very difficult to 
establish a relationship between levels of educational expenditure and student performance. 
An implication of this is the need for incentives to use expenditure more effectively and this is 
discussed below. First though it is worth noting some of the findings from detailed reviews by 
the OEC D (2005) and Gustafsson (2003) of the evidence on the relationship between 
education resources and student performance. 
Particular resource use: competent teachers, class size 
The OECD (2005) review of teacher policy reviewed a large body of research on student 
learning to draw three broad conclusions. First, the largest source of variation in student 
learning is attributable to differences in what students bring to school—their abilities and 
attitudes, and family and community background. Such factors are difficult for policy makers 
to influence, at least in the short-run. Second, of those variables which are potentially open to 
policy influence, factors involving teachers and teaching are the most important factors. In 
particular, the broad consensus is that “teacher quality” is the single most important factor. 
Third, while there is a positive relationship between student learning and readily measurable 
teacher characteristics such as qualifications, knowledge and teaching experience, these do 
not capture differences in teacher quality. 
Based on recent meta-analytic integrations of the estimates from different studies Gustafsson 
concludes there are indications of positive effects of resources:  
i. small class sizes for early years of primary schools especially for disadvantaged 
students  
ii. teacher competence  
The most telling evidence on class sizes came from the STAR experiment in the US where 
students were randomly assigned to small classes of 13-17, to regular classes of 22-26 and to 
regular classes with an assistant. These class sizes are far lower than the average in low 
income countries so there must be doubt as to the applicability of the findings to lower 
income countries. 
Improved outcomes with smaller classes in the early years of schooling may be due to a more 
effective socialization of students to the school environment in smaller classes (Gustafsson 
2003). It is reasonable to expect that the socialization effect is stronger for educationally 
disadvantaged groups, acquiring skills and habits which make it possible for students to cope 
with the requirements of life in school. Socialization appears to be an important contributing 
factor to student success within the school environment as a means of promoting engagement, 
particularly in the early years of schooling.  
On teacher competence Gustafsson (2003 p.102) sums up that:  
there are important relations between different indicators of teacher competence and 
student achievement. This seems to be true for teacher education, experience, measured 
knowledge and skills, and in-service training. 
Gustafsson cites Darling Hammond that the teacher competence involves being able to take 
the perspective of the learner and to use a use a broad repertoire of approaches skilfully, to 
undertake teaching that is purposeful and diagnostic and that responds to students’ needs as 
well as curriculum goals. 
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In this context it is worth noting the conclusions of a recent yet unpublished review in 
Australia that found that high performing schools tend to allocate a considerable proportion of 
experienced competent teachers to the early years of primary and secondary schooling.  
Complementary with these forms of analysis is the increased attention given to early 
childhood development. An illustration of the issues can be found in the work of Heckman 
(2006). Heckman a Nobel Prize winner in economics has researched the effects of early 
childhood intervention for less advantaged students. Two of the key findings from this are: 
− the pay off to investment in early childhood is far larger than intervention for older 
disadvantaged persons 
− the early intervention needs to support both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities  
Heckman says that much policy discussion is focussed on cognitive test score measurement, 
even though cognitive test scores miss important aspects of human development. Cognitive 
and non-cognitive ability are both important in explain schooling, crime and a variety of other 
outcomes. Non-cognitive ability is neglected in much public policy discussion regarding early 
childhood, although it is clearly important for later educational, economic and social success.  
System level and school organisation 
The research on class size and teacher competence do not say anything about overall school or 
system organisation. Schooling and the use of resources can be more effective in particular 
settings. OECD (2004) What Makes Systems Perform reports a study which examined the 
Programme of International Student Assessment (PISA) 2000 results against key features of 
the education systems of six countries which had good quality results on PISA—though with 
varying degrees of equity: Canada, England, Finland, France, Netherlands and Sweden. The 
countries all had addressed: 
− monitoring schools for weaknesses  
− giving support to schools, teachers and students where most needed  
− formulating at system level standards and expectation and 
− devolving responsibility for achieving specified goals 
The more successful countries placed social and cultural disparities at the centre of innovation 
strategies including assessing and supporting the performance of individual students. Success 
is related to support for teachers and schools in the context of an integrated rather than a 
differentiated school structure. Especially notable was that Finnish and Swedish schools tend 
to have a wide social mix, sustained to the classroom: 
Finnish classrooms are heterogeneous in terms of student’s abilities and backgrounds. 
This demands efficient learning in small groups with teachers ready to arrange new groups 
where necessary. Research appears to indicate that in Finland mixed ability classes have 
greatly advantaged lower–achieving students, while higher achieving students are not 
greatly affected by changes in the composition of a learning group (OECD 2004 p.41).  
The executive summary of the OECD (2007) No more failures, Ten Steps to Equity. provides 
further elaboration of many of these points. They classify their recommendations under the 
headings of design of the system, practices within the schools and resourcing. The ten steps 
are:  
Design 
1. Limit early tracking and streaming and postpone academic selection. 
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2. Manage school choice so as to contain the risks to equity. 
3. In upper secondary education, provide attractive alternatives, remove dead ends and prevent 
dropout. 
4. Offer second chances to gain from education. 
Practices 
5. Identify and provide systematic help to those who fall behind at school and reduce year 
repetition. 
6. Strengthen the links between school and home to help disadvantaged parents help their 
children to learn 
7. Respond to diversity and provide for the successful inclusion of migrants and minorities within 
mainstream education. 
Resourcing 
8. Provide strong education for all, giving priority to early childhood provision and basic schooling. 
9. Direct resources to the students with the greatest needs, so that poorer communities have at 
least the same level of provision as those better-off and schools in difficulty are supported. 
10. Set concrete targets for more equity, particularly related to low school attainment and 
dropouts. 
These features of a school system could be seen to be developed and promoted within a 
system of public education. Point 2 on managing school choice to contain risks to equity 
could refer to choice among government operated schools. However, in many countries there 
is a significant private sector and in recent times a strong move to encourage choice within the 
public system and between public and private schools. This is seen to provide parents with 
what they want and to put market pressures on the schools to use resources in the ways that 
have been identified to have most effect. This is the next issue considered. 
Market incentives 
Hanushek’s findings regarding expenditure and student performance draw attention to the 
need for incentives and guidelines so that resources are spent effectively. 
One way of promoting more efficient use of resources is to increase the degree of choice and 
market pressures on education.  
It is argued that:  
− competition among schools for students will help reduce inefficiencies in the 
delivery of education, and hence improve educational outcomes; and  
− choice would serve to give more control over educational decisions to parents who 
in turn would choose good schools for their children.  
When choices exist, it is believed that schools will look beyond their own walls at what 
others—their potential competitors—are doing and either match or differentiate from them, 
thus improve quality at the school as well as the system level. 
School choice has always existed for some groups in society. Higher income groups have 
always been able to choose between a public and private school. Choice has also existed for 
those who could afford to move to a particular school neighbourhood. Persons of low income 
and those in rural areas have limited choice. 
The experiences of offering choice and diversity in school education of a range of advanced 
countries are documented in Demand Sensitive Schooling OECD (2006). Experiences across a 
number of OECD countries confirm that better educated, middle-class parents are more likely 
to avail themselves of choice and send their children to the best school they can find. With a 
higher intake of more advantaged students the school’s performance will often climb, 
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improving further the status of the school. There is though the danger of an increasing gap 
between highly-performing and under-performing schools. The gap between the schools can 
also increase because the parents who exercise choice by taking their children out of a 
particular school are often the most critical, and therefore, the school loses those with the 
most effective voice for improvement from within. It can leave some schools with a greater 
concentration of disadvantaged students than before choice was introduced (Lamb 2007). 
The equity argument in favour of choice, on the other hand, is when this means extending to 
all the choices that privileged parents have always exercised. Choice can potentially allow 
poorer families access to good schools outside their neighbourhood by breaking the link 
between housing and schooling and thus decrease segregation. However even in rich 
countries few poorer families may exercise the choice.  
Choice proponents point to the achievements of pupils in private schools as evidence that 
choice delivers better outcomes. However, this is by no means clearly established and varies 
across countries.  
Information to support the market 
The assumption that parents will choose good schools assumes that parents have the 
information necessary for making this decision. Information is increasingly available about 
schools’ characteristics and their students’ performance on government and school websites 
and in the media. Parents from higher socio-economic background usually are able to access 
such information and analyse it better when making decisions about schools for their children 
than parents from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Concerns about the difficulty some 
parents were having in making informed decisions about the choice of schools for their 
children have recently prompted the English government to pilot a programme of school 
choice advisors for parents. 
Strong system organisation and a regulatory framework 
The market may be suitable for middle class and wealth groups but clearly will not satisfy the 
education objectives of a large part of the population. Indeed the operation of the market 
could further disadvantage some groups. However the past experiences of centralised 
prescription and examinations have also not been found to be effective. 
The issue then is to develop a system which does have incentives to use resources effectively, 
and to direct more of them to where they are most needed. At the same time there is a need to 
be able to identify and quickly remedy areas of poor performance. The four features identified 
by the OECD mentioned earlier indicate the matters that the central authorities in any system 
need to address include: 
− monitoring  for weaknesses  
− giving support t where most needed  
− setting system level standards and expectations, and 
− devolving responsibility where appropriate 
Similar broad findings were reported by Wöβmann (2003) using data from the Third 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). He concluded that student 
performance was likely to be highest in school systems that combine externally-set funding 
and performance standards, with school autonomy areas such as personnel management 
where school-level knowledge is important. 
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The first and third points identified by OECD (2004) require a statement of desired outcomes 
for schools, some measures of particular needs or disadvantage of schools and assessment of 
students so that  both good performance and weaknesses can be identified.  
Giving support where most needed also requires the sorts of data that is required for the first 
and third issues. It also means having research information available on effective use of 
resources and resourcing models to allocate funds to good effect. 
The last point on devolution implies that decisions should where possible be left to the 
principal and teachers and that good performance of increased responsibilities should be 
rewarded. The degree of devolution possible will be affected by the level of competence of 
teachers and principals and the resources that they have to support the tasks that might 
otherwise have been handled centrally.  
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